



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO MARITIME DOCTRINE

CONTENTS

The Nature of Maritime Doctrine	5
Aim of Maritime Doctrine	5
The Origin of the RSA's Maritime Doctrine	6
Cornerstones of Doctrine	6
People Matter Most	6
Doctrine is the Glue of Tactics	7
To Know Tactics You Must Know the Weapons	7
The Seat of Purpose is on the Land	8
Attack Effectively First	8
Hierarchy of Maritime Doctrine	8



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO MARITIME DOCTRINE

THE NATURE OF MARITIME DOCTRINE

Doctrine is a body of thought that underpins the development of defence policy; it is informative, whereas policy is essentially prescriptive. Doctrine has its foundation in history and derives its authority from being the distillation of much hard won experience. Therefore, it is enduring, but it is not unchanging. Doctrine evolves in response to changes in the political or strategic environment, in the light of experience, or as a result of new technology. In turn, it influences the way in which policy and plans are developed, forces are organised and trained, and equipment is procured.

Knowledge and understanding of doctrine, and its application, aid clarity of thought in the chaos of crisis and war. Sound doctrine provides a common approach and way of thinking, which is not bound by prescriptive rules. This will lead, through training, to consistent behaviour, mutual confidence and properly orchestrated collective action, whilst not constraining individual initiative.

Military Doctrine is those fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in its application. Doctrine is not a set of rules, which can be applied without thought; it is, rather, a framework for understanding armed conflict and the use of military force. Its purpose is to guide, to explain, to educate and to provide the basis for further study and informed debate.

Maritime Doctrine is that part of Military Doctrine that guides the actions of maritime forces in the pursuit of national and military objectives in support of national policy.

DOCTRINE: *“Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”*

AIM OF THE MARITIME DOCTRINE

Maritime Doctrine produces a way of thinking about maritime power and the conduct of operations. It provides maritime forces with clear statements about their roles and objectives. At the military-strategic level, doctrine informs the wider defence community (including politicians, industrialists and academics, for example) as well as interested members of the general public, about the roles and political utility of maritime forces.

The issue of *JOINTNESS* within the context of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is key – and especially when one considers the maritime environment. Since the dissolution of the ‘Cold War’ emerging emphasis is being placed internationally upon the concept of littoral warfare – and the land, air, sea (both the above- and the underwater dimensions), intelligence and space components thereof; as impacting within this unique region. Such battlespace requires a joint and multi-disciplinary approach to warfare.

The aim of the Maritime Doctrine for the South African National Defence Force is, therefore, to inform the reader on the *modus operandi* (how) of the South African Navy (SA Navy) in carrying out its responsibilities to the Government of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and the *raison d’être* (why) for so doing. The target group for the Maritime Doctrine (MD) is all members of the Armed Forces and the general public.

THE ORIGIN OF THE RSA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE

The origin of the RSA’s formal naval doctrine can be traced to the establishment of the South African Naval Service (SANS) on 1 April 1922. As a dominion of the British Commonwealth, it is perceived that doctrine applicable to the fledgling SANS was wholly imported and adapted from Royal Navy doctrine.

It was only with the RSA’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961 that other foreign sources gained prominence in the development of doctrine locally.

Current SA Navy doctrine is an amalgamation of the aforementioned, and the lessons learnt from other nations via open literature and other sources.

This publication, however, provides the first cognisant determination of the Maritime Doctrine for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) post 27 April 1994.

THE CORNERSTONES OF DOCTRINE

What is the ‘*meat*’ that makes doctrine a real, tangible operational and tactical imperative/utility? For the purposes of the Maritime Doctrine, use will be made of the Battle of the Nile on 1 August 1798, where the forces of French Vice-Admiral Francois Breuys faced the British Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson.

Arising from the Battle of the Nile the following five ‘*cornerstones*’ of Doctrine have been identified:

- People matter most.
- Doctrine is the glue of good tactics.
- To know tactics you must know weapons.
- The seat of purpose is on land.
- Attack effectively first.

The above ‘*cornerstones*’ will be briefly discussed hereafter.

PEOPLE MATTER MOST

Warfare is a deadly conflict. Ultimately it is the people that realise the fighting power of the armed forces. Their strengths require time, effort and resources if they are to be developed and exploited to the Nation's advantage. The morale component about fighting power is about persuading the people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that the purpose is morally and ethically sound; these promote the spirit and determination to achieve the aim. Many things contribute; training, confidence in equipment, firm and fair principles, self respect, adherence to the Code of Conduct and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. The potential to achieve military success requires motivation, leadership and management. Leadership, morale, training, physical and mental conditioning, will power and endurance are the most important elements in warfare.

Personnel are to be trained to the highest standards based upon sound tactics and technological understanding of the on-board weapons' systems. With astute operational planning one then can rely on their unwavering determination to successfully execute the required operational task, irrespective of whether it be of a warfare or a peace support nature.

DOCTRINE IS THE GLUE OF TACTICS

Doctrine is the commander's way, from the military strategic level through to the tactical level, of controlling his/her forces in writing before military action. In general, it is to derive the greatest benefit from current maritime forces in support of national policy. Doctrine is the companion and instrument of good leadership. It is the basis of all that that implies: cohesion, reliability in battle, and mutual understanding and support.

Doctrine may also be thought of as every action that contributes to ***the unity of purpose*** in a joint or multi-national force. Doctrine is greater than tactics in that it encompasses all aspects of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Infrastructure, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C⁴I³SR). It is less than tactics in that it can establish no more than procedures that enable and enhance the execution of tactical choices in the battlespace.

TO KNOW TACTICS – YOU MUST KNOW WEAPONS

Technological/technology advances keep weapons in a state of change – tactics enable the optimisation of the current '*on-board-fit*' of weaponry and the supporting "software" into a composite and effective weapon system.

The modern open-architecture, object-orientated programmable, and fully integrated combat management suites (CMSs), as proliferating into the maritime domain on a variety of new platforms, are so intertwined so as to make the tactical and technological spheres (and developments) of warfare inseparable.

THE SEAT OF PURPOSE IS ON LAND

Formerly, the destruction of the enemy's fleet was one's own fleet's foremost consideration in defeating the enemy – the so-called "Decisive Naval Battle". Nelson attempted that at the 'Battle of the Nile', and followed it up at the "Battle of Trafalgar". Neither action defeated the French as a nation, nor as an opponent.

The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between the United Kingdom and Argentina re-emphasised this conscript. Despite the sinking of the GENERAL BELGRANO with great loss of life, the Argentine surrender of the Falklands/Malvinas only occurred three months thereafter. It happened after they were faced with the alternatives of land force total destruction, or surrender. The sinking of the GENERAL BELGRANO did not result in the surrender, but the reality of losing the land battle resulted in the surrender. Maritime forces cannot occupy ground and thus, the main purpose of the maritime force in modern warfare is, by means of jointness, to support the land forces. Only once their objectives have been achieved, has the war been won.

Similar conscripts impact on the SANDF within the African sub-continent for the exercise of peace-support operations. The operations will continue until peace exists between the belligerents.

ATTACK EFFECTIVELY FIRST

To ensure success in combat, it is imperative to not only attack first, but to make the attack an effective one, otherwise the advantage is lost.

Realisation of this maxim is achieved by the Commander's judicious application of the SANDF's Principles of War – throughout the whole spectrum.

HIERARCHY OF MARITIME DOCTRINE

The roles of maritime forces in the protection of the RSA and its interests are derived from the Government's overall security and foreign relations policies. The SANDF's Military Strategy, from which the Maritime Doctrine takes its direct lead, is based on the following strategic hierarchy:




Figure 1: Hierarchy of Maritime Doctrine

- a. Constitution. The Constitution of the RSA determines that “*The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force*”. With that mandate lower order documents are drawn up to expand on the responsibilities of the SANDF and, therefore, the SA Navy.
- b. Defence Act. The Defence Act provides the framework within which the Department of Defence is to function.
- c. National Security Strategy. The RSA Government provides the National Security Strategy. Elements of the National Security Strategy are contained in the Constitution of the RSA, the White Paper on Defence, the Defence Review, and are elaborated upon by the President and Cabinet.
- d. Defence Policy. The White Paper on Defence, which describes Defence Policy, states that “*The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently*”. The White Paper is analysed further in the Maritime Doctrine to determine the implications for the SA Navy.
- e. Defence Review. The Defence Review, which is a periodic review, identifies the force design and force structure of the SANDF and, therefore, also the SA Navy, taking into account the guidelines of the Military Strategy and the available resources (for example, human resources and finances).

- f. SANDF Military Strategy. The SANDF Military Strategy provides general guidance for force development and force employment by means of strategic objectives, strategic concepts and strategic capabilities. It provides guidance by means of different missions that the SANDF must be able to conduct. The force development to be capable of carrying out the missions and employment of such forces is the responsibility of the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (C SANDF). These particular missions and objectives and their influence on the development of the Maritime Doctrine will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.
- g. Defence Doctrine. The Defence Doctrine is based upon lessons in history. It describes the linkages between national policy and military operations. The SANDF Services formulate their doctrine based upon the Defence Doctrine.
- h. Employ Forces Strategy. The Employ Forces Strategy is the sub-strategy that is formulated by Chief of Joint Operations. This sub strategy consists of the following:
 - i. Force Employment Strategy. The Force Employment Strategy is the SANDF strategy for the conduct of operations. It provides guidelines to the SANDF with respect to multi-national, joint and service-unique force employment missions.
 - ii. Joint Force Preparation Strategy. The Joint Force Preparation Strategy of Chief of Joint Operations describes the ends, ways and means to prepare Joint Combat Ready Forces.
 - iii. The Multi-national Force Preparation Strategy. The Multi-national Force Preparation Strategy of Chief of Joint Operations describes the ends, ways and means to prepare Multi-national Combat Ready Forces.